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Book Review

Breakdown: The Inside Story of the Rise
and Fall of Heenan Blaikie by Norman
Bacal1
DANIEL DEL GOBBO2
THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE IS CHANGING. Data over the last three

decades show a trend toward larger law firms.3 Many of the country’s most storied
1.
2.

3.

Norman Bacal, Breakdown: The Inside Story of the Rise and Fall of Heenan Blaikie (Toronto:
Barlow Books, 2017) [Breakdown].
2017 Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholar, 2016 CBA Viscount Bennett Fellow, and SSHRC
Doctoral Fellow, SJD Candidate (Toronto), LLM (Harvard), JD (Osgoode), Hons BA
(Queen’s), of the Bar of Ontario. The author worked as a summer student, articling student,
and litigation associate in Heenan Blaikie LLP’s Toronto office from 2010 to 2014. The
author would like to thank Brenda Cossman, Adam Dodek, Rory Gillis, Richard Haigh,
Nadia Lambek, and Simon Stern for their instructive comments on earlier drafts.
Fiona M Kay, Stacey Alarie & Jones Adjei, “Leaving Law and Barriers to Re-entry: A Study
of Departures from and Re-entries to Private Practice” (23 April 2013) Law Society of Upper
Canada 11-12. For a detailed discussion of the drivers of big law firm growth in Canada,
see Ronald J Daniels, “Growing Pains: The Why and How of Law Firm Expansion” (1993)
43 UTLJ 147. For a survey of the extensive literature on the growth of big law firms in the
United States, see generally Marc Galanter & Thomas M Palay, “Why the Big Get Bigger:
The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms” (1990) 76 Va
L Rev 747; David B Wilkins & G Mitu Galati, “Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law
Firms” (1998) 84 Va L Rev 1581; Randal S Thomas, Stewart J Schwab, & Robert G Hansen,
“Megafirms” (2001) 80 NCL Rev 115; Marc Galanter & William Henderson, “The Elastic
Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm” (2008) 60 Stan L Rev 1867;
Eli Wald, “Smart Growth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty-First Century” (2012) 80
Fordham L Rev 2867; Albert Yoon, “Competition and the Evolution of Large Law Firms”

1360 (2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

‘big law’ corporate firms have exploded in size and reach.4 Almost all of these
firms maintain offices across the country and satellite offices in key international
markets.5 Other large firms have been subsumed into foreign conglomerates
pursuing expansion into the Canadian legal market.6 These developments have
led to an increase in revenues and business opportunities for senior partners at
these firms. It has also led to unprecedented challenges for the management of
big law firms in Canada. As one of the former managing partners of Heenan
Blaikie LLP (Heenan Blaikie), Norman Bacal knows this better than most.
Founded in 1973, Heenan Blaikie was conceived as a boutique law firm
in Montreal, employing a handful of lawyers in the areas of employment and
entertainment law. By 2012, Heenan Blaikie was the fifth largest and one of
the most prestigious full-service law firms in Canada, boasting nearly six
hundred lawyers and one thousand three hundred staff, including two former
Prime Ministers and a retired Supreme Court judge, across ten offices on three
continents. Less than two years later in February 2014, Heenan Blaikie collapsed.
It remains the largest and most spectacular law firm failure in Canadian history.7

4.

5.
6.
7.

(2013) 63 DePaul L Rev 697. For a discussion of big law firm growth in other countries, see
Bruce E Aronson, “Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really
Better? An International Comparison” (2007) 40 Vand J Transnat’l L 763.
Ibid. This includes each of the so-called “Seven Sisters” corporate law firms which are said
to be major players in the Canadian legal market (Blake Cassels & Graydon; Davies Ward
Phillips & Vineberg; Goodmans; McCarthy Tetrault; Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt; Stikeman
Elliott; and Torys) as well as a number of other large corporate law firms in Canada (e.g.,
Borden Ladner Gervais; Gowling Lafleur Henderson; Fasken Martineau; Miller Thomson;
McMillan; Cassels Brock & Blackwell). I will use the term big law throughout to refer to
this collective group of Canadian firms as well as large foreign conglomerate firms entering
Canada. See infra note 6.
Ibid. See also D Daniel Sokol, “Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a
Research Agenda for Further Studies” (2007) 14 Ind J Global Legal Stud 5.
Ibid. Recent examples of international corporate firms entering Canada include Norton Rose
Fulbright (swallowing up national firm Ogilvy Renault), Dentons (swallowing up Fraser
Milner Casgrain), DLA Piper (swallowing up Davis), and Baker & McKenzie.
See Gail J Cohen, “How Partnerships Ain’t All They Cracked up to Be,” Canadian Lawyer
38:3 (2014) 3 (“There’s never been a legal story in Canada that’s had the impact of the death
of Heenan Blaikie”); Ian Holloway, “Heenan Blaikie the legal canary; firm reveals flaws in
partnership model,” Financial Post (12 February 2014), FP1 (“Measured in terms of column
inches, the collapse of Heenan Blaikie is the biggest story concerning the Canadian legal
profession in modern history.”) After Heenan Blaikie, the next largest Canadian law firms to
collapse were Goodman and Carr (2007) and Holden Day Wilson (1996). Some of the most
notable US law firms to recently collapse were Dewey & LeBoeuf (2012), Howrey (2011),
Wolf, Block (2009), Morgan & Finnegan (2009), Heller Ehrman (2008), Thelen (2008),
Dreier (2008), Thacher, Profitt & Wood (2008), Jenkins & Gilchrist (2007), Coudert
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Bacal’s Breakdown is his controversial book about Heenan Blaikie’s rapid ascent
and even swifter decline. In the introduction, he bills the story as a cautionary tale
for managers in the legal, accounting, and consultancy professions charged with
the task of leading a large institution in the post-recession economy.8 Bacal shows
how a critical lack of loyalty between the partners bred a crisis of confidence in
the leaders’ ability to protect the firm’s unique culture in the face of pressures to
over-commercialize. Contrary to popular reports, the firm did not go bankrupt.9
Rather, it was no longer attractive enough for certain partners to stay and accept
a lower salary than other big law firms could pay—as those partners had done
for years—in light of recent changes to the firm’s management philosophy. This
increasing unattractiveness led to a series of senior partner defections and forced
the remaining partners to reassess their relationship. In other words, financial
concerns alone did not bring down the firm. Heenan Blaikie sank because its
partners jumped ship. One of the book’s most important lessons is that a firm’s
leadership, when at loggerheads, can fray the bonds of an otherwise profitable
partnership until those bonds finally snap. Professional managers would do well
to avoid Heenan Blaikie’s mistakes.
Breakdown is divided into three parts, mapping roughly onto the three
periods of Heenan Blaikie’s rise to regional pre-eminence, the height of its national
success, and its fall into dissolution. The first part, “From Student to Leader,
1980-1996,” describes Bacal’s experience as a law student, associate, and partner
at Heenan Blaikie before he became one of its managing partners. Bacal traces
the growth of the firm through a series of interesting if occasionally overlong
anecdotes about his entertainment law practice. These stories reveal Bacal to be
an enterprising young lawyer as he navigated office politics and pursued new lines
of business. Given his pivotal role in founding Heenan Blaikie’s Toronto office at
age 33, Bacal emerges as the natural leader of a different kind of large law firm
in Canada: one that is a little younger and more nimble; one that encourages its
lawyers to be entrepreneurs; and at the same time being one that, above all, puts
people before profits, unlike its big law firm competitors already established on
Bay Street. Bacal describes his early days with the partnership: “The magic we
relied on, and that I would have to master, consisted of keeping the relationships

8.
9.

Brothers (2005), Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (2003), Altheimer & Gray (2003), Arter &
Hadden (2003), Hill & Barlow (2002), Shea & Gould (1995), Mudge Rose (1995), Lord,
Day & Lord (1994), and Finley Kumble (1987).
Breakdown, supra note 1 at xv.
Ibid at 289.
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personal. We had to make these difficult men and women feel valued and loved
and attached to a culture that was the foundation on which we built the firm.”10
Maintaining this unique culture was crucial to Bacal’s long-term management
philosophy.11 The second part of Breakdown, “Leading a Firm, 1997-2012,”
describes his experience as co-managing partner of Heenan Blaikie. Under
Bacal’s leadership, Heenan Blaikie grew from a specialized firm with a regional
presence in Ontario and Quebec into a national powerhouse with wide-ranging
corporate-commercial and litigation reach. Bacal attributes Heenan Blaikie’s rise
to its “fresh approach to the practice of law.”12 This approach was manifested in
a series of gutsy decisions by the firm to expand into new and emerging practice
areas—decisions born of good instincts by its lawyers and mutual trust in their
abilities rather than strict adherence to current market demand.13 Other big law
firms in Canada expanded into new practice areas more incrementally, serving
their institutional clients’ needs first instead of their lawyers’ practice interests.
With Bacal at the helm, Heenan Blaikie’s culture encouraged its lawyers to
“experiment, be brave, fail occasionally, and push in new directions.”14
These experiments paid off handsomely for the firm. Bacal admits that most
of the partners were paid more than they could ever have imagined when they
started their careers, although not as much as they could have if they had practiced
at other big law firms in Canada. The traditional big law model of professional
service delivery, not unlike the ‘big accounting’ or ‘big consultancy’ models,
assumes that partners of large law firms are autonomously self-interested actors
who must be compensated based on their individual books of business rather
than on seniority or community service; otherwise, the partners might conduct
their practices at the expense of the entire firm.15 Larry Ribstein argues that the
management philosophies founded on this idea have supported the institution of
new structural hierarchies within many large law firms, including the increased
hiring and training of associates without realistic prospects of promotion, the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ibid at 119.
Ibid at 38.
Ibid at 169.
Ibid at 167.
Ibid at 194.
See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 3 at 1872; Russell G Pearce & Eli Wald, “The
Relational Infrastructure of Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big
Law” (2013) 42 Hofstra L Rev 109 at 110-20. For a discussion of the history of the big law
firm model, see Samantha Robbins, “From Big Law to Legal Education: The Trickle Down
Effect of the Recession” (2014) 27 Geo J Legal Ethics 841 at 842-43; Larry E Ribstein, “The
Death of Big Law” (2010) Wis L Rev 749 at 755.

Gobbo, Breakdown 1363

recruitment of lateral partners with discrete practices and weak attachments
to the firms, and the stratification of partners into different tiers of influence
that disproportionately reward star business generators.16 By institutionalizing
hierarchy in these ways, the traditional big law model privileges commercial
values at the expense of ethical values and produces environments that promote
unnecessary competition between colleagues.17
From Bacal’s description, Heenan Blaikie partners appear to have been
motivated by what Russell Pearce and Eli Wald have theorized as “relational
self-interest” in conducting their legal practice, which means that the lawyers
recognize that “all actors are inter-connected, whether [as] individuals [or in
groups] … [and] cannot maximize [their] own good in isolation.”18 The clearest
example is that the firm’s partners agreed to accept their unique culture by taking
lower salaries than partners at comparable firms. This salary differential was
known for years as the Heenan Tax.19 Bacal explains: “For those of us who were
brought up in the firm, this philosophy was tied to a reverse snobbery about the
larger, more profitable firms. We couldn’t see ourselves fitting into another major
firm with constricting rules and general unhappiness. Our quirky acceptance of
one another and the genuine mutual respect we all shared came with an overall
loss of efficiency.”20 When richer firms came knocking, most lawyers refused
to consider the alternative because “Heenan Blaikie was their Camelot.”21 The
strong implication here is that living a happy life on Bay Street means striving
against the over-commercialization of the traditional big law model in Canada.
The third part of Breakdown, “Failure in Leadership, 2013,” describes the
series of events that tested Heenan Blaikie’s ability to maintain its unique culture
in the face of pressures to over-commercialize in a struggling economy. The
firm’s leaders failed this test and the partnership lost its way. This is the most
compelling section of Bacal’s book, providing an ultimate insider’s perspective
on the individually surmountable challenges that were collectively mishandled
by Heenan Blaikie’s management: a bruising partner compensation review that
depressed firm morale;22 a lease of new and expensive office space in Toronto
16. Ibid at 754-57. See also Galanter & Palay, supra note 3 at 748-56.
17. See Eli Wald, “Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes,
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms” (2009) 78 Fordham L Rev
2245 at 2264-73.
18. Pearce & Wald, supra note 15 at 110, 128-40.
19. Breakdown, supra note 1 at 193-94.
20. Ibid at 194.
21. Ibid at 194, 322.
22. Ibid at 249-53.

1364 (2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

that the firm did not need;23 a series of risky international ventures, including
a shiny Paris office24 and a global consulting practice,25 that failed to make any
money; a rogue partner in Montreal whose unethical business connections to an
international arms dealer were publicly exposed;26 an increasingly hostile media
and rumour mill that magnified the firm’s mistakes;27 and, most damaging of all,
a bungled transition in leadership that saw two new managing partners, Robert
Bonhomme in Montreal and Kip Daeschel in Toronto, deadlocked over what to
do about the growing crisis.28
Bonhomme was the hatchet man. He wanted to trim the fat that was
weighing Heenan Blaikie down. This meant firing dozens of poor performers,
reducing the lawyers’ benefits, and eliminating the more innovative and
speculative business lines to fit the mould of more lucrative big law firms on
Bay Street.29 Bacal’s bias in his assessment of this strategy is obvious: “Robert
believed we needed to start putting profitability at the front line in order to save
the firm. No one was psychologically prepared for this kind of shock treatment.
We were drifting from our basic firm philosophy. Like chemotherapy, the
proposed cure was killing parts of the patient.”30 For his part, Daeschel agreed
with Bacal’s view about the importance of maintaining Heenan Blaikie’s culture,
but he lacked the wherewithal to counter Bonhomme’s tactics and offer a more
comprehensive strategy that would appease the bottom-liners.31 Bacal and some
other Toronto partners tried to intervene on Daeschel’s behalf, but they no longer
had the mandate to push back against the forces of corporatization in a firm that
had grown too large, too quickly. The rift exposed a deeper conflict between
the business philosophies of Heenan Blaikie’s regional practice leaders, such that
Bonhomme quickly became persona non grata in Toronto.32 He later argued for
the balkanization of the firm’s provincial operations.33
It appears that in one short year, whatever charismatic forces had once
unified the dreamers at Heenan Blaikie were lost, or at least were no longer
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Ibid at 318-19.
Ibid at 206-15, 246-47.
Ibid at 216-18, 253.
Ibid at 223-29, 232.
Ibid at 254.
Ibid at 320.
Ibid at 250.
Ibid at 265-66.
Ibid at 256.
Ibid at 257.
Ibid at 263.
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persuasive enough to overcome the widespread displeasure and dissensus that
had gripped the firm. This disintegration was not an unexpected phenomenon.
Ribstein suggests that big law firms are vulnerable to collapse when the ties that
bind lawyers to institutional cultures become unraveled, shifting the dynamic
from cooperation to competition.34 Bacal similarly explains that “[f ]or a firm that
prided itself on creating a warm environment where it was fun and exciting to
come to work in the morning, a gloom had set in. The Heenan Tax was no longer
an anecdote. It was a noose.”35 As the firm’s management philosophy changed
and the partners’ emotional and financial investments in Heenan Blaikie waned,
they faced a Prisoner’s Dilemma. They feared that other partners might take their
clients and leave instead of working together to restore the firm for everyone’s
benefit.36 Too many partners were afraid of being last with their fingers in the
dike, so they left the firm to drown. Bacal’s refrain is clear: “Like the deserting
spouse in the marriage, their self-interest superseded their commitment to the
rest of us who stayed behind.”37 The departing partners had put profits before
people. As soon as they forgot what they were about, Heenan Blaikie had failed.38
Had they stayed true to their roots, the firm could have survived.39
The subject of Heenan Blaikie’s collapse is contested terrain. Of course,
Bacal can only tell Heenan Blaikie’s story through his own eyes, in his own voice,
reflecting his own individual biases from the self-stylized perch of “rainmaker”
and managing partner.40 Others are certain to have a different perspective on the
events and available means to express themselves in public or private settings.41
Stories abound in Canadian legal circles about how the firm’s employees were
personally affected by the crisis.42 Few of these stories have appeared in print.
Bacal’s readers might wonder how one of Heenan Blaikie’s junior partners, raising
34. Ribstein, supra note 15 at 759.
35. Breakdown, supra note 1 at 317.
36. Ribstein, supra note 15 at 759. See also Robert W Hillman, “Law Firms and Their Partners:
The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving” (1988) 67 Tex L Rev 1.
37. Breakdown, supra note 1 at 317.
38. Ibid at 321.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid at 41.
41. For example, a range of employee and employer perspectives on Heenan Blaikie’s collapse
may be found in the court filings. See Jeff Gray, “Former employees sue Heenan Blaikie,” The
Globe and Mail (15 October 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
industry-news/the-law-page/former-employees-sue-heenan-blaikie/article21117724/>.
42. Cohen, supra note 7 at 3 (“It was the biggest law firm collapse in Canadian history
and almost everyone I know is either personally affected or knows people personally
affected by it”).
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three children on her own and facing the total loss of her capital contribution
upon the firm’s dissolution, would have reacted to the news of her more senior
male partners’ defections; or how one of the firm’s legal assistants, a twenty-year
veteran in the role and on the verge of his well-earned retirement, would have
been compelled to re-enter the job market at an advanced age; or how one of the
firm’s junior associates, paying off her student debt and suddenly fired without
severance, would have made the agonizing decision to delay her plans to start a
family; or how one of the firm’s articling students, forced to complete his articles
elsewhere with no prospect of getting hired back, would have gained a formative
education in the brutal business of big law. Bacal intimates these stories but never
gives them their full due. Perhaps he could not, perhaps he chose not to.
Bacal describes Breakdown as “a story of leadership and how it develops,
of the importance of people to an organization, of the stories we tell about
ourselves and what those stories reveal of our value systems.”43 At bottom, the
book is a cautionary tale about professional management written by a former
professional manager and intended to be read by current and future professional
managers. While it succeeds as a case study in executive education, the book is a
limited and somewhat impoverished vision of the multi-level social implications
of partners’ decisions to act in their autonomous self-interest within big law firm
organizations in Canada.
Throughout the book, Bacal’s memories of Heenan Blaikie are drawn with
a “high degree of nostalgia.”44 His pain at the dissolution of the firm is real.
These emotions lend credibility to Bacal’s experiences and give his arguments
about professional management a certain normative force, but they may have
compromised his ability to critically reflect on the firm’s failings and his own
potential role in bringing it down. Readers should wonder about the kind of
cautionary tale that another insider like Bonhomme or an unaffiliated outsider
might write. Could it be, as Jonathan Kay suggests, that “the demise of Heenan
Blaikie is proof that big firms need bean-counters, not visionaries, in the corner
offices?”45 What if aspects of Heenan Blaikie’s unique culture, born of its roots
as a boutique law firm over forty years ago, simply cannot be scaled to a larger,
more diverse institutional provider of professional services today? Could it be
that kinder and gentler big law firms like Heenan Blaikie are unsustainable in the
43. Breakdown, supra note 1 at 41.
44. Ibid at xv.
45. Jonathan Kay, “Lessons from the Largest Law-Firm Implosion in Canadian History,” The
Walrus (27 February 2017), online: <thewalrus.ca/lessons-from-the-largest-law-firmimplosion-in-canadian-history/>.
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increasingly globalized economy, which requires that ethical values of informality,
collegiality, independence, and public service be marginalized in the quest to
remain relevant?46 What if the real cause of Heenan Blaikie’s collapse was the
misguided leadership of managers like Bacal and Daeschel, who failed to focus
on the bottom line as a necessary corrective to the firm’s unchecked idealism in
a precarious time?
Breakdown should have answered these questions more directly. Even if
we accept Bacal’s argument that Heenan Blaikie could have weathered the
storm with the benefit of stronger, more inspired leadership, it is unclear how
his management philosophy of “putting people before profits” would have
responded to changing economic conditions, technological innovations, and
client business practices that are transforming the nature of professional work
and would have only increased the pressures on the firm to over-commercialize
after the storm had cleared.47 Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay suggest that large
law firms have no option but to reorganize their institutions to promote the more
efficient sharing of human capital in a “promotion-to-partnership tournament”
structure or else suppress the growth of their business.48 If Heenan Blaikie lawyers
“couldn’t see [them]selves fitting into another major firm with constricting rules
and general unhappiness,”49 perhaps they could not have succeeded on Bay Street
for much longer without adopting a model that included more constrictive rules
and sacrificed their general happiness. Given the book’s limited mandate to
warn future professional managers against potential dangers, Bacal should have
explained how his advice applied in light of emerging market forces on Canadian
legal practice.
Nevertheless, Bacal contributes to these debates by opposing his own
management philosophy against the prevailing ideology of big law that is reflected
by Bonhomme’s slash-and-burn approach to the crisis. Bacal could have framed
his argument in more radical terms, but the book still reads as an attack on the
relentlessly individualistic and adversarial culture that determines the design of
most large law firms and contributes to an increasing unhealthy and unhappy legal
profession in Canada. Attitude theory teaches that feelings of career satisfaction
mediate the relationship between lawyers’ jobs, their firms’ institutional processes,

46. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 3 at 755-56.
47. See Daniels, supra note 3 at 161-74; Ribstein, supra note 15 at 760-71; Yoon, supra
note 3 at 716-17.
48. Galanter & Palay, supra note 3 at 756.
49. Breakdown, supra note 1 at 194.

1368 (2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

and turnover.50 Studies show that career satisfaction predicts rates of employee
retention across the professions, including law.51 Patrick Schiltz summarizes some
of the reasons given by lawyers for their unhealthiness and unhappiness:
They complain about the commercialization of the legal profession—about the fact
that practicing law has become less of a profession and more of a business. They
complain about the increased pressure to attract and retain clients in a ferociously
competitive marketplace. They complain about having to work in an adversarial
environment “in which aggression, selfishness, hostility, suspiciousness, and
cynicism are widespread.” They complain about not having control over their lives
and about being at the mercy of judges and clients. They complain about a lack of
civility among lawyers. They complain about a lack of collegiality and loyalty among
their partners. And they complain about their poor public image. Mostly, though,
they complain about the hours.52

Schiltz further explains that rates of depression, anxiety, substance
abuse, divorce, and suicide are higher for lawyers than for members of other
professions.53 Within the legal profession itself, rates of career dissatisfaction
are higher for large firm lawyers than for lawyers who work in other practice
settings.54 Fiona Kay’s work has shown that large firm environments have a direct
impact on the decisions of Canadian lawyers (and female associates in particular)
to switch firms and, in some cases, to leave private practice altogether.55
Feelings of career dissatisfaction among large firm lawyers are so endemic that
professional managers are designing the firms’ recruitment processes, training
programs, and incentive structures around the lawyers’ expected high rates of
attrition. These measures have come at the expense of comprehensive attempts
to reform the underlying assumptions of big law and the institutional processes
based on these assumptions that are driving the problem of unhealthiness and
unhappiness among lawyers. Given that the instruments for large firm growth
are constantly evolving, the focus of researchers’ efforts should be exploring new,
more holistic, and potentially redemptive models for the delivery of professional
services in Canada.
50. Kay, Alarie, & Adjei, supra note 3 at 3.
51. Ibid.
52. Patrick J Schiltz, “On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession” (1999) 52 Vand L Rev 871 at 888-89.
53. Ibid at 874-81.
54. Ibid at 886.
55. Kay, Alarie, & Adjei, supra note 3 at 54. See also Deborah K Holmes, “Structural Causes
of Dissatisfaction among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective” (1990) 12
Women’s Rts L Rep 9.
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Breakdown is a fascinating and detailed case study of a large law firm grappling
with the design of its institutions and ultimately giving into political and
economic pressures to over-commercialize its culture, which inspired widespread
career dissatisfaction among its partners who then ran for the bank. Managers
who are interested in the means of professional service delivery in Canada should
heed the warnings of Bacal’s cautionary tale. But as a critical intervention in the
academic literature about the ethics of big law practice in the post-recession era,
the book falls short. At a time when innovation in the legal profession is needed
more than ever, reformers should look outside the corner office, and perhaps
outside the large law firm altogether, for more radical perspectives on how lawyers
can put people before profits.

